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One advantage of having a simple world view is that it allows
one to organize one's life into neat little compartments. It is not
surprising, then, that many legal scholars seek simple organizing
principles by which to analyze complicated legal issues. Simple explanations are inherently satisfying, and scientists dub the most
beautiful and simple of them "elegant." In a broad sense, the
drive for simplicity has been the motivating force behind the major
movements in legal scholarship of this century, beginning with
Legal Realism. It is natural and understandable to long for the
good old days.
It is fair to say, then, that Richard Epstein's Simple Rules for a
Complex World treads old ground in its effort to reduce law to some
small, easily understood group of rules against which to measure
behavior. This is both a blessing and a bane. As a framework
against which to analyze discrete problems, his approach is a valuable one, couched as it is in classical microeconomic theory
presented in a nontechnical narrative. But untested and unquestioned in this approach is the wealth of unrealistic assumptions
which underlie the classical approach. What we get is a series of
thought experiments, applied to a few discrete areas of law which
are anathema to Epstein (such as regulatory takings, fiduciary obligations within the corporation, and antidiscrimination laws, to
name a few), which make sense as intermediate microeconomic
theory exam questions, but have little applicability to the world in
which we live. Thus, while Epstein's arguments are provocative
starting points for discussion, they are unlikely to win over any
converts.
We live in an economist's second-best world. It is second-best
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. J.D., Ge-

orgetown University Law Center; M.Phil., MA. Yale University; S.B. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thanks to Michael Zimmer, Ahmed Bulbulia, Michael Meurer,
Simon Evenett, and Adrienne B. Koch for helpful comments.

1414

BOOK REVIEW

1415

because we know that the classical conditions which are necessary
for a global Pareto optimum do not exist. This is necessarily the
starting point for Epstein's argument, for his goal is to show that
the current legal regime's tremendous departures from his freemarket ideal are suboptimal. We can agree, then, that our society
is not perfect. But the economist's notion of second best differs
from the popular notion in a profound way. It is not simply a step
removed from the first best. Rather, it is a departure from first-best
such that the restoration of some (but not all) of the conditions
necessary for a Pareto optimum will not guarantee a Pareto improvement. 1 Nevertheless, I note that in this second-best world, the
overwhelming majority of contracts are fully executed, almost all
automobile trips end without a collision, and almost all deliveries
result in healthy babies and mothers. Epstein would argue that all
of these transactions come at a tremendous cost imposed by excessive regulation, but the fact is that his evidence is drawn mainly
from a few odd statutes, regulations and appellate cases which have
engendered arguably inefficient outcomes. The evidence he adduces, then, is of the exceptional cases, which do not necessarily
lend themselves to general conclusions. The challenge that Epstein faces is to justify departures from our admittedly second-best
regime by showing that the second-best world that he would create
is unambiguously superior to the one that we already have.
As in much of the law and economics literature, Professor Epstein's desire is to be prescriptive rather than descriptive, and his
ambition is to create a set of rules which would organize all behavior. He claims to have reduced all of what law should be to seven
simple rules: "self-ownership, or autonomy; first possession; voluntary exchange; protection against aggression; limited privilege for
cases of necessity; takings of property for public use on payment of
just compensation," 2 and (grudgingly) redistribution through flat
taxes.' If successful, this would be a truly remarkable feat, for it
took God ten rules to do the job the first time around.4
1 The theory of the second best was developed by Lipsey and Lancaster. "The
general theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is introduced into a
general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the
Paretian conditions, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in
general, no longer desirable." R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the
Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956).
2 RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, SiMPLE RuLEs FOR A CoMPLEx WoRL 53 (1995).
3 Id. at 148.
4 Exodus 20:1-17. Epstein would claim, I think, that these were both over- and

under-inclusive. The first three are at odds with his small-state, libertarian approach
since they create a strong central government: two severely restrict freedom of ex-
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The distinction between the prescriptive and descriptive approaches is important. If one adopts the prescriptive approach,
then it is incumbent upon the proponent to show that his prescription is robust. That is, he must demonstrate that his synthesis has
global applicability, rather than simply being a random happy result in the isolated examples that he cares to explore. The descriptive approach is more limited and more scientific, but its weakness
for the proponent is that it provides little in the way of soundbite
fodder, since it offers no formula for change. It emulates the "scientific method" in that it puts forth a testable hypothesis; the hypothesis is tested against the available evidence; the evidence either
refutes or fails to refute the hypothesis; and, eventually, if we are
confident that the experiment was sound, then the hypothesis is
elevated to theory.
But the inquiry does not end there. New circumstances may
arise against which the theory can be tested, and if the theory is no
longer applicable, then the time has come to scrap or modify the
theory. The arrival of new evidence does not mean that the first
theory was a bad theory; the theory of gravitation worked perfectly
well for the 200 years between Newton and Einstein, and gravitation still works fine if you want to shag flies on a sunny day and you
don't want to travel to a distant galaxy. Add a strong wind and you
need to know something about air resistance; we modify the old
theory, but we don't throw it away. My point here is that we can
choose an appropriate level of detail at which to describe scientific,
economic or legal phenomena and gain some insight commensurate with that level of detail; it is a mistake, however, to conclude
that a theory which explains ninety percent of the observed data is
necessarily the correct stopping point.
A limited descriptive approach would have been far more convincing. When I first read a draft of the introductory three chapters of this book, I was struck immediately by the elegance of its
approach, for I was then under the impression that Epstein's goal
was to describe the majority of legal relationships, rather than prescribe a set of rules to govern all legal relationships. I believed
that Epstein was going to point out, correctly, that the vast majority
pression and one unduly restricts the ability of an employer and an employee to bargain over the terms of employment. They are simple, though. It's those nasty
regulations that really messed things up. See, e.g., Leviticus passim (setting forth regulations in administrative form); Luke (setting forth regulations in parable form); Talmud (private letter rulings). They are under-inclusive in that, while three of the rules
presume the existence of a set of transferable property rights, none establishes those
rights or creates a mechanism for transfer.
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of interactions between persons in our society are organized about
an essential set of simple rules.
Stripped to their core concepts, for example, the Uniform
Commercial Code is about voluntary exchange; the Thirteenth
Amendment is about self-ownership; much of criminal law expresses the "keep off' and "don't touch" principles; and the takings
clause expresses the just compensation idea. But the goal of the
book is different. He seeks to prescribe a set of rules to govern all
actors at all times in all circumstances, claiming that they "have the
virtue of offering solutions for 90 to 95 percent of all possible situations."5 And the other five to ten percent? Epstein replies:
Never ask for more from a legal system. The effort to clean up
the last 5 percent of cases leads to an unraveling of the legal
system insofar as it governs the previous 95 percent. No single,
carefully constructed hypothetical case offers sufficient practical
reason to overturn any rule that has stood the test of time.6
Let us understand the terms of the debate as stated by Professor Epstein. First, the seven simple rules cover more than ninety
percent of all possible situations, although the book is devoid of
any support for that proposition. Second, any attempt to refute
the argument by counterexample is an attempt to use one of those
"carefully constructed hypothetical" cases which falls into the remaining five to ten percent. Third, any effort to account for the
world of the counterexamples will unravel the entire legal system.
This is a daunting challenge, for the terms of the debate as set
forth by Epstein are stacked in his favor.
I propose an alternative structure: test the argument by examining one essential assumption, and then attempt to replicate the
experiment using one of the rules. First, let us test the assertion
that deference to individual decisionmaking is or should be the
primary motivation for our political system. Second, test the rule
of self-ownership using Epstein's own criteria.7
The devolution of decisionmaking down to the smallest possible administrative unit is the "small is beautiful" school of political
thought, embodied in Epstein's "spheres of hegemony" construction. At its core is an unprovable assertion of values, claiming that
small group decisions are better than large group decisions be5

Id.

6 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 53.

7
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Independence that it was "self-evident," but apparently it was self-evident only for

white males.
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cause dividing society into ever smaller groups creates a larger
number of groups from which to choose, and choice is always welfare-improving. Before we start down this path, we should recognize that the need for collective decisions is itself a response to
market failure. Individual decisions are undermined by the cost of
collecting information, imperfect evaluation of information and
the nature of information as a public good, for example. Changing the level at which decisions are made does not correct these
market failures.
Epstein argues that:
the function of the law is to set the spheres of hegemony for
each person. The insistence on the autonomy of the person,
and on the dominance of private over collective property, is an
effort not to promote greed and selfish behavior but to create
many small separate domains in which informal
norms can take
8
over, at far greater precision and lower cost.
Consider, for example, the hegemony of the family. Epstein
claims:
A legal rule that calls for noninterference in the ordinary life of
the family is one such rule. It recognizes that huge areas of personal behavior, from child raising, to sexual conduct, to financial affairs, are best regulated not by one collective response
from the center, but by many smaller and autonomous groups
pursuing their ends by means that they devise for themselves
without popular or electoral approval. 9
The critical question here is what Epstein means by "ordinary life,"
for in that qualification lies the erosion of the argument. States
split, for example, on whether or not parents are immune from
suit by their children for their non-negligent torts, creating a wide
disparity in the legal regime regarding parental imposition of corporal punishment. 10
Florida, Kentucky and Mississippi all recognize a defense to
murder for a man who finds his wife in flagrante delicto,1 1 but California and New York permit no such defense.12 The age of consent
varies from state to state for marriage, intercourse and years of
8 Id.
9 EpsrEIN, supra note 2, at 46.

10 See Caroline E. Johnson, A Cry for Help: An Argument for Abrogation of the ParentChild Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 617,
620-21 (1993).
11 Whidden v. State, 59 So. 561 (Fla. 1912); Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky.
229 (1924); Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87 (1920).
12 People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288 (1883), affd, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); People v.
Wood, 126 N.Y. 249 (1891).
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compulsory education. What is "ordinary life" in these states? One
possibility is that "ordinary life" varies from state to state, but that
would reduce Epstein's argument to an absurdity. If the state is the
arbiter of "ordinary life," then there is no room for small group
hegemony; the large group defines the legitimate scope of smallgroup decisionmaking. And such a view would conflict with Epstein's small-state, libertarian view that the individual is and should
be the core decisionmaking unit in society.
"Ordinary life" has to rest on some collective notion, and the
nub of the issue is how we as a society come to an agreement on
what that notion is. An extreme view, which I do not hold, is that
everything which goes on within the four walls of the home is nobody else's business. That is certainly hegemony, and it certainly
comports with Epstein's "keep off' view of law, but it means that
battered women have no choice other than to leave; emotionally,
physically and sexually abused children have no access to guardians
ad litem and foster care; and senior citizens have no protection
against financial misdeeds of their defalcating children. One easy
answer is that these activities are proscribed by virtue of the "protection from aggression" rule, but that merely begs the question of
what is the appropriate level of decisionmaking. If the family is the
appropriate level, then by definition there is no aggression.
As a society, we now say that these things are wrong, irrespective of the fact that there are those who defend such practices. Our
collective decision, therefore, is not a result of a Pareto-improving
transfer, which is generated by the consent of all individuals. It is
the will of a political majority, and we all accede to it; the dissenters
in the political debate are given their say, but once the rule becomes law, then the dissenters who act rather than speak are punished. Epstein concedes as much:
The differences in cultural views and elaboration will not be resolved harmoniously by political debate, even though they may
be determined by fiat through majority rule. But no one should
think that the outcomes that result from protracted political
conflicts approximate those that come within a country mile of
satisfying those that come within a mile of satisfying some ideal
of unanimous consent. A system of limited government-one
that does a few tasks well-is far more likely to achieve social
harmony than a system of government that
unleashes the war13
ring impulses of clashing political forces.
We all recognize that, as a society, we should embark upon those
13 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47.
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courses of action which enjoy unanimous consent. Those are the
courses of action which would be undertaken in the absence of any
formal mechanism of government whatsoever. But our hard questions revolve around those decisions which cannot be made unanimously, so to say that the outcomes achieved through political
conflict do not satisfy the ideal of unanimous consent is to set up a
false basis for comparison. The candidates for decision by majority
rule are necessarily those which have failed to achieve unanimous
consent.
An alternative view is that individual decisionmaking is a necessary first step in the process of experimentation, but it is not the
ultimate goal. When Justice Brandeis advanced the view that states
were the laboratories of federalism, 14 his point was that our political subdivisions were free to experiment with alternate legal and
economic systems which might benefit their citizens, subject to regulation by the federal government under such doctrines as the dormant commerce clause.
What happens, though, when two laboratories reach different
results, but the gains to one state from a uniform national law exceed the losses to another? Coasean trade might theoretically result in an agreement to adopt a uniform national law and
reallocate the gains to the loser, but our experience shows that
such results do not occur in practice; Article III's creation of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of disputes between states"
was at least tacit admission of the potential for friction. The proper
role of federalism, in an evolving national economy, may be to create an evolution toward a stronger central government, rather than
the devolution to states, localities and individuals.
Epstein's first rule-that each person owns himself-is unobjectionable, but hisjustification for the rule is flawed. Consider the
extreme cases of slavery (third-party ownership) and collective
ownership. It is unclear to me whether Epstein's objection to slavery is based on moral grounds or on economic grounds, although
it appears to be an amalgam of the two. He identifies the basis of
the moral objection to slavery as based on "the indignities that it
heaps upon those who are its victims. Stated in familiar terms, the
inability of slaves to say no (save on pain of torture) to whatever is
commanded of them creates terrible incentives for exploitation by
14 New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
15 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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the owner."1 6 He contends that, "[u]nder slavery, the gains to the
owner will systematically fall below the losses to the slave." 7
If Epstein's claims were correct, then our country's bitter dispute over slavery would never have ripened, as it did, into the Civil
War. Slaves, who could be freed through voluntary manumission
by their owners, could have contracted Chicago-style with their
owners for their freedom. The federal prohibition on importation
of slaves beginning in 180818 should have begun a steady decrease
in the number of slaves held. In fact, however, the opposite was
true.1 9
Take Epstein's transaction cost indictment of the slavery system. If the administrative burden of establishing title to slaves were
so cumbersome, then the system should have collapsed under its
own weight. Yet Dred Scoti ° affirmed the vitality of the administrative system for controlling slave ownership, maintained under a series of fugitive slave acts2 1 adopted from time to time from the
beginning of the Republic through 1850. In my view, the fact that
almost four centuries passed between the introduction of slavery
into the Americas and its abolition bears silent testimony to the
conclusion that administrative costs were not a major concern of
slaveowners.
Then again, if it is merely an administrative burden and the
absence of voluntary contracting that condemns slavery, what
would Professor Epstein say about the establishment of a feudal
system, since the initial transaction in which the serf is tied to the
land (or, in a modern context, tied to shares of common stock or
16

Id.

17 EPSTEIN, supra note

2, at 56.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (barring federal prohibition on slave trade until
1808); Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (barring international slave trade beginning in 1808). By 1808, before the federal ban on international slave trade had taken
effect, many states (including slave states) had already acted to ban the import or
export of slaves. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1878 (1993).
19 Between 1820 and 1860, the "free Negro" male and female populations approximately doubled (from 112,734 to 234,119 and from 120,790 to 253,951, respectively),
while the corresponding slave populations nearly tripled (from 788,028 to 1,982,625
18

for males and from 750,010 to 1,971,135 for females). BUREAU OF

THE CENSUS,

U.S.

1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, at 18 (1975).
20 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. The Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 60, § 32, 10
Stat. 277 (1854) finally unraveled the Missouri Compromise and the precarious Compromise of 1850.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
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to equipment or real estate leases) would be a voluntary one, to
which the prospective serf has the power to say, "No."
No, the thing that turned some people into slaves and left
others free was the same thing that kept some of us safe in Brooklyn rather than fearful in Warsaw during the Second World War:
luck. The lucky ones-the ones who avoided becoming property
by virtue of conquest and capture-remained free, while the unlucky ones were drawn into a society which recognized Epstein's
second rule (the rule of first possession), but not the first rule.
Epstein attempts to tread a line between majoritarianism and
individualism, asserting instead that he "seeks to avoid both horns
of the dilemma by creating separate zones of influence, where
smaller groups are able to achieve through informal means greater
cohesion and consensus, and to leave old groups and to form new
ones when old alliances fail or become outmoded."2 2 His central
claim, then, is that the line is found by encouraging "the development of a network of voluntary transactions in which individuals
deal on their own behalf with trading partners of their own
choice."2"
Given that the world is second-best, has Epstein made a convincing argument to scrap our legal regime in favor of the smallstate, libertarian alternative? I think not. The world which Epstein
longs for-that of the good old days-is one which we as a society
abandoned piecemeal beginning in the late nineteenth century.
That world was one of twelve- to fourteen-hour workdays, six days a
week; unsafe factories; low wages; short life spans; education for
the few; unplanned growth of cities; and environmental nightmares. Our predecessors in this society agreed, against vociferous
and bitter dissent, to change, reflecting what I believe to be a rejection of the arguments which Epstein has resurrected today. The
good old days, it seems, are good in our dreams, and perhaps that
is the way they should stay.

22 Id.
23 EPSTEIN,

supra note 2, at 47-48.

